We present a rst-order logic of time, chance, and probability that is capable of expressing the relation between subjective probability and objective c hance at di erent t i m e s . U sing this capability, w e show h o w the logic can distinguish between causal and evidential correlation by distinguishing between conditions, events, and actions that 1) in uence the agent's belief in chance and 2) the agent believes to in uence chance. Furthermore, the semantics of the logic captures commonsense inferences concerning objective c hance and causality. W e show that an agent's subjective probability is the expected value of its beliefs concerning objective c hance. We also prove that an agent using this representation believes with certainty that the past cannot be causally in uenced.
Introduction
The ability to distinguish evidential from causal correlation is crucial for carrying out a number of di erent t ypes of problem solving. To perform diagnosis we must be able to identify the factors that caused an observed failure in order to determine how to repair the faulty device. If we cannot distinguish causal from evidential correlation, we m a y end up treating the symptoms rather than the causes of the fault. When reasoning about plans, an agent m a y h a ve goals that involve achieving a speci ed state of the world, or achieving a speci ed state of knowledge, or a combination of both. In order to e ectively reason about such goals, we need to distinguish actions that in uence the state of the world from those that only in uence our state of knowledge of the world.
In this paper we extend Haddawy's 3] logic of time, chance, and action L tca by adding a subjective probability operator. We s h o w h o w the resulting rst-order logic of time, chance, and probability, L tcp , can distinguish between causal and evidential correlation by distinguishing between conditions and events that 1) in uence the agent's belief in chance and 2) the agent believes to in uence chance. Furthermore, the semantics of the logic captures some commonsense inferences This work was partially supported by NSF grant # I R I -9207262.
concerning causality and the relation between objective chance and subjective probability. W e prove that an agent's subjective probability is the expected value of its beliefs concerning objective c hance. We a l s o p r o ve that an agent whose beliefs are represented in this logic believes with certainty that the past cannot be causally in uenced. On the other hand, an agent can execute actions that in uence its subjective beliefs about the past.
Ontology
We brie y present t h e o n tology of the logic, which i ncludes the representation of time, facts, events, objective c hance, and subjective probability. F or simplicity of exposition, we will omit the representation of actions and will treat them as events. For a more detailed development o f c hance, facts, events, and actions see 3] .
Time is modeled as a collection of world-histories, each of which is one possible chronology or history of events throughout time. A totally ordered set of time points provides a common reference to times in the various world-histories.
We represent a n a g e n t's beliefs with subjective probabilities. Since beliefs may c hange with time, subjective probability i s t a k en relative t o a p o i n t in time. We represent i t b y de ning a probability distribution over the set of world-histories at each p o i n t in time. So an agent can have beliefs concerning temporally quali ed facts and events.
We represent causal correlation with objective chance. Objectively, actions and events can only a ect the state of the world at times after their occurrence. That is to say, a t e a c h point in time, the past is xed| no occurrences in the world will cause it to change but at each p o i n t in time the future might unfold in any n umber of ways. So relative t o a n y point i n t i m e , only one objectively possible past exists, but numerous possible futures exist. Thus we represent objective chance by de ning a future-branching tree structure on the world-histories and by de ning probabilities over this tree. Like subjective probability, c hance is taken relative t o a p o i n t in time. By de ning chance in this way, conditions in the present and past relative t o a given time are either certainly true of certainly false. So actions and other events can only a ect the chances of future facts and events. This property distinguishes objective c hance from subjective probability. Subjectively the past can be uncertain but objectively it is completely determined.
The present c haracterization of objective c hance is not to be confused with the frequentist interpretation of probability 10, 11] which is often called objective probability. Frequentist theories de ne probability in terms of the limiting relative frequency in an in nite numb e r o f t r i a l s o r e v ents. The current work does not rely on relative frequencies for its semantics. Rather it models objective c hance by formalizing the properties that characterize objective c hance. Thus while frequentist theories have di culty assigning meaningful probabilities to unique events like a sh jumping out of the water at a given location and time, our model has no problem in assigning nontrivial probabilities to such e v ents. Our model of objective c hance and subjective probability is motivated by the subjectivist theories of objective c hance 6, 8, 9] , which de ne chance in terms of properties that one would expect a rational agent to believe objective chance to possess.
This distinction between the frequentist theory of probability and our conception of objective c hance puts the present w ork in sharp contrast with Bacchus's 1] logic of statistical probabilities which models exactly relative frequency type probabilities. One telling di erence between the two logics is that Bacchus's logic Lp assigns only probability 0 or 1 to unique events (more precisely, to all closed formulas). The present logic can assign any c hance value to unique events in the future, while events in the past are assigned only chance values 0 or 1, as required by our de nition of objective c hance.
It is reasonable to expect the subjective beliefs of a rational agent concerning objective c hance to obey certain constraints. Skyrms 7, Appendix 2] has argued for a constraint he calls Millers' principle. This asserts that an agent's subjective belief in a proposition, given that he believes the objective c hance to be a certain value, should be equal to that value. Skyrms argues that this is a plausible rule for assimilating information about chance. We will call this relation the subjective/objective Miller's principle.
The world is described in terms of facts and events. Facts tend to hold and events tend to occur over intervals of time. So facts and events are associated with the time intervals over which they hold or occur in the various world-histories. Facts are distinguished from events on the basis of their temporal properties. A fact may hold over several intervals in any g i v en world-history and if a fact holds over an interval then it holds over all subintervals of that interval.
Events are somewhat more complex than facts. First, one must distinguish between event types and event tokens. A n e v ent t ype is a general class of events and an event t o k en is a speci c instance of an event type. Event tokens are unique individuals { the interval over which a n e v ent t o k en occurs is the unique interval associated with the event token and an event token can occur at most once in any w orld-history. The present w ork deals with event t ypes, which for brevity are simply referred to as events. 3 The Logic of Time, Chance, and Probability Henceforth we will use the symbol t, possibly subscripted, to denote time points , , a n d to denote formulas and and to denote probability v alues. In addition to the usual rst-order logical operators, the language contains two modal operators to express subjective probability and objective c hance. The operators are subscripted with a time since according to the ontology subjective probability and objective c hance are taken relative t o a p o i n t in time. We write P t ( ) to denote the subjective probability o f at time t and we write pr t ( ) to denote the objective c hance of at time t. Probability is treated as a sentential operator in the object language. So the probability operators can be arbitrarily nested and combined with one another, allowing us to write complex sentences like: \I believe there was a one in a million chance of my winning the lottery, y et I won." P t3 (pr t2 (OCCURS(win t 1 t 2 ) ) = 1 0 ;6Ô CCURS(win t 1 t 2 ) ) = 1 where t 1 < t 2 < t 3 . W e also allow conditional probability sentences such a s P t ( j ) = , which i s i n terpreted as shorthand for P t ( ^ ) = P t ( ).
The language of L tcp is fully rst-order, allowing quanti cation over time points, probability v alues, and domain individuals. A formal speci cation of the syntax is provided in the full paper 2].
Semantics
We describe only the more interesting aspects of the models of L tcp . The models are completely speci ed in the full paper. A model is a tuple hW D , FN FA is the set of facts, a subset of 2 (< <) W . A fact is a set of htemporal interval, worldi pairs: fhht 1 t 0 1 i w 1 i : : : hht n t 0 n i w n ig. I f fa is a fact and hht 1 t 2 i w i 2 fa then fa holds throughout interval ht 1 t 2 i in world-history w. EVENTS is the set of event t o k ens, a subset of (< < ) W. A n e v ent t o k en is a single htemporal interval, worldi pair. EV is the set of event types, a s u b s e t of 2 EVENTS . A n e v ent t ype is a set of event tokens: fhht 1 t 0 1 i w 1 i : : : hht n t 0 n i w n ig. I f ev is an event and hht 1 t 2 i w i 2 ev then ev occurs during interval ht 1 t 2 i in world-history w. If R(t w 1 w 2 ) w e s a y a w orld-history w 2 is Raccessible from w 1 at time t. The set of all worldhistories R-accessible from w at time t will be designated R w t
. F or each time t, t h e R w t partition the world-histories into sets of equivalence classes indistinguishable up to t. X is a -algebra over W 1 , containing all the sets corresponding to w 's in the language, as well as all R-equivalence classes of world-histories. P R o is the objective probability assignment f u n ction that assigns to each time t 2 < and worldhistory w 2 W a countably additive probability distribution o w t de ned over X . P R s is the subjective probability assignment f u n ction that assigns to each time t 2 < and worldhistory w 2 W a countably additive probability distribution s w t de ned over X . Given the models described above, the semantic definitions for the well-formed formulas can now b e d ened. Denotations are assigned to expressions relative to a model, a world-history within the model, and an assignment of individuals in the domain to variables. The denotation of an expression relative t o a m o d e l M and a world-history w, a n d a v ariable assignment g is designated by ] ] M w g . Figure 1 shows the less familiar semantic de nitions. The remainder are provided in the full paper.
Semantic Constraints
In order to obtain the properties discussed in the ontology, w e impose eight constraints on the models.
The future-branching temporal tree is de ned in terms of the R relation over world-histories. To c a pture the property that the tree does not branch i n to the past, we s a y that if two w orld-histories are indistinguishable up to time t 2 then they are indistinguishable up to any earlier time:
(C1) If t 1 t 2 and R(t 2 w 1 w 2 ) t h e n R(t 1 w 1 w 2 ). 1 A -algebra over W is a class of subsets that contains W and is closed under complement and countable union.
Since R just represents the indistinguishability of histories up to a time t, for a xed time R is an equivalence relation, i.e., re exive, symmetric, and transitive: (C2) R(t w w) If R(t w 1 w 2 ) t h e n R(t w 2 w 1 ) If R(t w 1 w 2 ) a n d R(t w 2 w 3 ) then R(t w 1 w 3 ) As mentioned earlier, facts and events di er in their temporal properties. This distinction is captured by the following two semantic constraints. If a fact holds over an interval, it holds over all subintervals, except possibly at the endpoints:
(C3) If t 1 t 2 t 3 t 4 t 1 6 = t 3 t 2 6 = t 4 fa 2 FA and hht 1 t 4 i w i 2 fa then hht 2 t 3 i w i 2 fa: An event token occurs only once in each w orld-history: (C4) If evt 2 EVENTS, hht 1 t 2 i w i 2 evt, and hht 3 t 4 i w i 2 evt then t 1 = t 3 and t 2 = t 4 . If two w orlds are indistinguishable up to a time then they must share a common past up to that time. And if they share a common past up to a given time, they must agree on all facts and events up to that time. To enforce this relationship, we impose the constraint t h a t if two w orld-histories are R-accessible at time t, t h e y must agree on all facts(events) that hold(occur) over intervals ending before or at the same time as t: (C5) If t 0 t 1 t 2 and R(t 2 w 1 w 2 ) t h e n hht 0 t 1 i w 1 i 2 A i hht 0 t 1 i w 2 i 2 A, where A is a fact or event.
The ontology discussed two desired characteristics of objective c hance. The rst is that the chance at a time t be completely determined by the history up to that time. The second desired characteristic is that the chance of the present and past should be either zero or one, depending on whether or not it actually happened. These two properties follow as meta-theorems from the following two constraints:
(C6) For all X 2 X t t 0 and w w 0 such t h a t R(t w w 0 ) def of c-prob
In the ontology, w e argued that subjective probability and objective c hance should be related to one another by Millers' principle. This relation is enforced by the following constraint, which s a ys that the probability o f a s e t o f w orlds X, g i v en some R equivalence class, should just be the objective c hance in that equivalence class. 
Theorems
We rst provide several simple theorems that will be used in later proofs. Then we prove t wo f o r m s o f Miller's principle and provide two associated expected value properties. Proofs not provided here appear in the full paper.
Theorem 3 From $ infer pr t ( ) = pr t ( ): Theorem 4 Stronger sentences have lower probability.
From ! infer P t ( ) P t ( ).
Theorem 5 Certainty cannot be c onditioned away from.
Theorem 6 The present and past are objectively certain. Let be a fact or event:
HOLDS( t t 0 ) or OCCURS( t t 0 ) then 8t t t 0 (t 0 t) ! pr t ( ) = 0 _ pr t ( ) = 1]
The semantic constraints on objective c hance give us a version of Miller's principle that relates objective chance at di erent times. It says that the chance of a sentence at a time, given that the chance of at the same or a later time is , should be . We rst prove an expected value property and then use it to prove Miller's principle. Let t t 0 be two time points t t 0 and consider the R-equivalence classes of worlds at time t 0 . L e t t h e v ariable r range over these equivalence classes. The r form a partition of W, s o t h e probability o f a s e t X can be written as the integral over this partition: o w t (X) = (dr) where o r t 0 denotes the probability a t t i m e t 0 in equivalence class r. Since the probability at a given time is assumed to be constant o ver all worlds in an Requivalence class, the probability at a given time is the expected value of the probability a t a n y future time t 0 (X) = g): By the semantic de nitions it follows that P t ( ^P t 0 ( ) = ) = P t (P t 0 ( ) = ): And by a slight generalization of the proof it follows that 8(t t 0 ) P t ( ^P t 0 ( ) ) P t (P t 0 ( ) ): 2
From the Objective Miller's Principle it follows directly that current c hance is the expected value of current chance applied to current or future chance.
Theorem 8 Objective Expected Value Property
All instances of the following sentence schema are valid in L tcp . 8 t 1 t 2 (t 1 t 2 ) ! pr t1 (pr t2 ( ) ) ! pr t1 ( ) ] As discussed in the ontology, the current subjective probability o f a s e n tence, given that the current o r f uture chance is some value should be that value. The following theorem shows that this property follows from the semantics of the logic.
Theorem 9 Subjective/Objective Miller's Principle (SOMP)
All instances of the following sentence schema are valid in L tcp . 8 t 0 t 1 (t 0 t 1 ) ! P t0 ( jpr t1 ( ) = ) = Proof: We rst prove an expected value property a n d then use it to prove Miller's principle. Let t t 0 be two time points t t 0 and consider the R-equivalence classes of worlds at time t 0 . Let the variable r range over these equivalence classes. The r form a partition of W, so the probability of a set X can be written as the integral over this partition: s w t (X) = Since the chance at a given time is assumed to be constant o ver all worlds in an Requivalence class, the subjective probability a t a n y t i m e is the expected value of the subjective probability a pplied to the objective c hance at that time: And by a slight generalization of the proof it follows that 8t t 0 (t t 0 ) ! P t ( jpr t 0 ( ) ) 2 From the subjective/objective Miller's principle it follows directly that subjective probability is the expected value of current subjective probability applied to present o r f u t u r e c hance. 
Distinguishing Evidential and Causal Correlation
We wish to distinguish between two situations in which an agent m a y believe t h a t t wo conditions are correlated. An agent m a y believe that two conditions are correlated because one is simply evidence for another and an agent may believe that they are correlated because one causes the other. Let stand for the formula HOLDS ( t t 0 ) o r OCCURS( t t 0 ) and let stand for the formula HOLDS ( t t 0 ) o r OCCURS( t t 0 ). We represent evidential correlation as correlation in the subjective probability distribution, which is the standard approach i n B a yesian decision theory.
De nition 11 We say that is evidence for or against i P now ( j ) 6 = P now ( ) (1) It follows from this de nition that is not evidence for or against i P now ( j ) = P now ( ) We represent causal correlation by reference to the objective c hance distribution. We represent an agent's belief that causally in uences by s a ying that there is some value for the objective c hance of such t h a t the agent's belief in given the objective c hance of just before holds or occurs is not the same as the agent's belief given also knowledge of . In other words, knowledge of overrides knowledge of the objective chance of .
De nition 12 We say that i s a c ause of i 9 P now ( j pr t ( ) = ^ ) 6 = :
(2) Note that this does not necessarily imply that P now ( j ) 6 = P now ( ). Thus we m a y h a ve causal correlation without evidential correlation and, conversely, we m a y h a ve evidential correlation without causal correlation. It follows from this de nition that is not a cause of i 8 P now ( j pr t ( ) = ^ ) = :
Example
We n o w present an example demonstrating the use of the de nitions and theorems. We wish to describe the following situation. You have a coin that may be biased 3:1 towards heads or 3:1 towards tails. You believe there is an equal probability of each. You can observe the coin. If the coin looks shiny, this increases your belief that the coin is biased towards heads. You also have a magnet that you can use to in uence the outcome of the coin toss. Turning on the magnet biases the coin more toward heads. We can describe the situation with the following set of sentences in which \heads" is the event of the coin landing heads, \shiny" is the event o f the coin being observed to be shiny, and \magnet" is the fact that the magnet is on.
(now < t 0 < t 1 < t 2 < t 3 < t 4 ) Turning on the magnet in uences the chance of heads. P now (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 )j (3) pr t1 (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 ) ) = 3 =4Ĥ
OLDS(Ma g n e t t 1 t 4 ) ) = 7 =8 P now (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 )j (4) pr t1 (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 ) ) = 1 =4Ĥ OLDS(Ma g n e t t 1 t 4 ) ) = 1 =2 The probability that the coin is biased toward heads and the probability that the coin is biased toward tails are equal. 2 P now (pr t1 (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 )) = 3=4) = (5) P now (pr t1 (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 )) = 1=4 ) = 1 =2 Observing the coin doesn't in uence the chance of heads.
8 t (t > now) ! (6) P now (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 ) j pr t (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 )) = Ô CCURS(Shiny t 0 t 2 )) = Observing the coin gives us knowledge of its bias. P now (pr t0 (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 )) = 3=4 j (7) OCCURS(Shiny t 0 t 2 )) = 5=8 P now (pr t0 (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 )) = 1=4 j (8) OCCURS(Shiny t 0 t 2 )) = 3=8 Turning on the magnet does not give us knowledge of the coin's bias.
8 P now (pr t1 (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 )) = j (9) HOLDS(Magnet t 1 t 4 )) = P now (pr t1 (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 )) = ) The coin is either biased toward heads or toward tails. 8t pr t (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 )) = 3=4 _ (10) pr t (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 ) ) = 1 =4
Using this information, we can make several useful inferences. First we can derive the unconditional probability that the coin will land heads. From (5) by SOMP we h a ve P now (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 )) = (12) (1=2)(3=4) + (1=2)(1=4) = 1=2 Next, we can use the above information to derive the probability that the coin will come up heads given that it is observed to be shiny. Instantiating (6) with = 3 =4 a n d t = t 0 and multiplying the result by ( 7 ) we g e t P now (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 )^(13) pr t0 (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 )) = 3=4 j OCCURS(Shiny t 0 t 2 )) = (5=8)(3=4) = 15=32 And instantiating (6) with = 1 =4 a n d t = t 0 and multiplying the result by (8) we g e t P now (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 )^ (14) pr t0 (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 )) = 1=4 j OCCURS(Shiny t 0 t 2 )) = (3=8)(1=4) = 3=32 From (10), (13), and (14) by the law of total probability we g e t P now (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 ) j (15) OCCURS(Shiny t 0 t 2 )) = 9=16 We can also derive the probability of heads given that we activate the magnet. From (3), (5), and (9) we get P now (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 )^(16) pr t2 (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 )) = 3=4 j HOLDS (Magnet t 1 t 4 ) ) = ( 1 =2)(7=8) = 7=16 From (4), (5) , and (9) we g e t P now (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 )^(17) pr t2 (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 )) = 1=4 j HOLDS (Magnet t 1 t 4 ) ) = ( 1 =2)(1=2) = 1=4 From (10), (16), and (17) by the law of total probability we g e t P now (OCCURS(Heads t 2 t 3 ) j (18) HOLDS (Magnet t 1 t 4 ) ) = 1 1 =16
The temporal ow of causality
Using our de nition of causal in uence and SOMP we can now s h o w that an agent whose beliefs are represented with L tcp believes that the past cannot be in uenced.
Theorem 13 Let be a fact or event:
HOLDS ( t t 0 ) or OCCURS( t t 0 ) and let be a f a c t o r e v e n t :
HOLDS ( t t 0 ) or OCCURS( t t 0 ).
Then all instances of the following sentence s c h e m a a r e valid in L tcp .
t t t 0 t t 0 (t 0 t )^(t t ) ! P t ( jpr t ( ) = ^ ) =
Proof: We prove a slightly more general result of which the above sentence is an instance. By the Subjective/Objective Miller's Principle, 8 t t 0 t t 0 (t 0 t 0 )^(t t 0 ) ! (19) P t ( ^pr t 0 ( ) = ) = P t (pr t 0 ( ) = ) Since valid formulas have probability one, it follows by Theorem 6 that, 8 t t 0 t t 0 t t 0 (t 0 t 0 )^(t t 0 ) ! (20) P t ( ^pr t 0 ( ) = ^ pr t 0 ( ) = 0 _ pr t 0 ( ) = 1]) = P t (pr t 0 ( ) = ^ pr t 0 ( ) = 0 _ pr t 0 ( ) = 1]) Since pr t 0 ( ) = 0 and pr t 0 ( ) = 1 a r e m utually exclusive, we h a ve 8 t t 0 t t 0 (t 0 t 0 )^(t t 0 ) ! (21) P t ( ^pr t 0 ( ) = ^pr t 0 ( ) = 0) + P t ( ^pr t 0 ( ) = ^pr t 0 ( ) = 1) = P t (pr t 0 ( ) = ^pr t 0 ( ) = 0 ) + P t (pr t 0 ( ) = ^pr t 0 ( ) = 1 ) Now w e h a ve three cases to consider: i) = 0 , ii) = 1 , iii) 0 < < 1.
Case i)
Expression (21) reduces to 8t t 0 t t 0 t t 0 (t 0 t 0 )^(t t 0 ) ! (22) P t ( ^pr t 0 ( ) = 0) = 0 P t (pr t 0 ( ) = 0 ) So by Theorem 4 and universal generalization, 8t t 0 t t 0 t t 0 (t 0 t 0 )^(t t 0 ) ! (23) P t ( ^pr t 0 ( ) = 0^ ) = 0 P t (pr t 0 ( ) = 0 )
Case ii) Expression (21) reduces to 8t t 0 t t 0 (t 0 t 0 )^(t t 0 ) ! (24) P t ( ^pr t 0 ( ) = 1) = P t (pr t 0 ( ) = 1) So by Theorem 5 and universal generalization, 8t t 0 t t 0 t t 0 (t 0 t 0 )^(t t 0 ) ! (25) P t ( ^pr t 0 ( ) = 1^ ) = P t (pr t 0 ( ) = 1^ ) Case iii) For 0 < < 1, P t (pr t 0 ( ) = ) = 0. So by Theorem 4 and universal generalization, 8 t t 0 t t 0 t t 0 (26) (t 0 t 0 )^(t t 0 )^(0 < < 1) ! P t ( ^pr t 0 ( ) = ^ ) = P t (pr t 0 ( ) = ^ ) Therefore we h a ve p r o ven that the following sentence is valid 8 t t 0 t t 0 t t 0 (t 0 t 0 )^(t t 0 ) ! (27) P t ( jpr t 0 ( ) = ^ ) = from which it follows that the past cannot be in uenced. 2 6 Related Work
Three outstanding subjective theories of objective chance from the philosophical literature are those of van Fraassen 9], Lewis 6] , and Skyrms 7] . v an Fraassen's model of objective c hance is more constrained than Lewis's model which is more constrained than Skyrms's model. Thu s , i n v an Fraassen's model, chance has more inherent properties than in either Lewis's or Skyrms's models. van Fraassen's theory is the only one of the three that is cast in a temporal framework. All three are semantic theories and do not provide logical languages. The model of objective c hance used in L tcp is based on van Fraassen's 9] model of objective c hance. He presents a semantic theory that models subjective probability and objective c hance, using a future-branching model of time points. van Fraassen places two c o nstraints on objective c hance:
1. The chance of a past is either 0 or 1, depending on whether or not it actually occurred. 2. Chance at a time is completely determined by history of the world up to that time. From these assumptions, he shows the following relation between subjective probability and objective c hance P t (XjY ) = E Y C t (X)] where P t is the subjective probability at time t, C t is the objective c hance at time t, E Y is the expected value given Y , and provided the truth of Y depends only on the history up to t. This relation entails both Miller's principle and Lewis's principal principle, discussed below. Note that van Fraassen does not show t h a t a s i m ilar relation holds between objective c hances at di erent times. In van Fraassen's models, objective c hance can change with time but truth values cannot.
Lewis's 6] theory of objective c hance is based on his assertion that ... we h a ve s o m e v ery rm and de nite opinions concerning reasonable credence (subjective probability) about chance (objective chance). These opinions seem to me to afford the best grip we h a ve on the concept of chance. He describes a number of intuitive relationships between subjective probability and objective c hance and shows that these are captured by his principal principle: P r (Ajpr t (A) = ^E) = where P ris subjective probability, pr is objective chance, and E is any proposition compatible with pr t (A) = and admissible at time t.
The interesting thing here is the proposition E. T h e constraint t h a t E be compatible with pr t (A) = means that P r (E^pr t (A) = ) > 0. Admissibility i s l e s s readily de ned. Lewis does not give a de nition of admissibility but he does characterize admissible propositions as \the sort of information whose impact on credence about outcomes comes entirely by w ay of credence about the chances of those outcomes." So objective c hance is invariant with respect to conditioning on admissible propositions. This concept of invariance under conditioning is the central notion of Brian Skyrms's theory of objective c hance. Skyrms 7] works with the notion of resiliency. A probability v alue is resilient if it is relatively invariant under conditionalization over a set of sentences. The resiliency of P r (q) b e i n g is de ned as 1 minus the amplitude of the wiggle about :
The resiliency of P r (q) b e i n g is 1;maxj ; P r j (q)j over p 1 : : : p n , where the P r j 's are gotten by conditionalizing on some Boolean combinationof the p i 's which is logically consistent with q. Skyrms then de nes propensity (objective c hance) as a highly resilient subjective probability.
Independent of his resiliency notion, Skyrms requires that propensities and subjective probabilities be related by Miller's principle: P r (Ajpr(A) = ) = where Pr is a subjective probability and pr is a propensity. He shows that Millers' principle entails that subjective probabilities are equal to the expectation of the subjective probabilities applied to the objective probabilities. But Skyrms 7, p158 ] points out that, counter to intuition, independence in every possible objective distribution does not imply independence in the subjective distribution. This observation provided the motivation for our use of the two probabilities to distinguish causal from evidential correlation. Halpern 4, 5] presents a probability logic that can represent both statistical and subjective probabilities. Statistical probabilities represent proportions over the domain of individuals, while propositional probabilities represent degrees of belief. The two probability operators in the language can be nested and combined freely with other logical operators. So the language is capable of representing sentences like \The probability is .95 that more than 75% of all birds can y." The models for the language contain a domain of individuals, a set of possible worlds, a single discrete probability function over the individuals, and a single discrete probability function over the possible worlds. The rst probability function is used to assign meaning to the statistical probability operator, while the second is used to assign meaning to the propositional probability operator. Although he does not place constraints within the logic on the relation between the two probabilities, he does discuss a form of Miller's principle that relates subjective and objective probabilities. His version of the principle states that \for any real number r 0 the conditional probability o f (a), given that the probability o f a r a ndomly chosen x satis es is r 0 , is itself r 0 ." He points out that this could be used as a rule for inferring degrees of belief from statistical information.
Bacchus 1] presents a logic essentially identical to that of Halpern. He goes further than Halpern in exploring the inference of degrees of belief from statistical probabilities. According to his principle of direct inference, an agent's belief in a formula is the expected value with respect to the agent's beliefs of the statistical probability of that formula, given the agent's set of accepted objective assertions.
